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Takeuti’s Well-Ordering Proof: Finitistically
Fine?
Eamon Darnell and Aaron Thomas-Bolduc
Abstract If it could be shown that one of Gentzen’s consistency proofs for pure
number theory could be shown to be finitistically acceptable, an important part of
Hilbert’s program would be vindicated. This paper focuses on whether the transfi-
nite induction on ordinal notations needed for Gentzen’s second proof can be fini-
tistically justified. In particular, the focus is on Takeuti’s purportedly finitistically
acceptable proof of the well-ordering of ordinal notations in Cantor normal form.
The paper begins with a historically informed discussion of finitism and its lim-
its, before introducing Gentzen and Takeuti’s respective proofs. The rest of the paper
is dedicated to investigating the finitistic acceptability of Takeuti’s proof, including
a small but important fix to that proof. That discussion strongly suggests that there
is a philosophically interesting finitist standpoint that Takeuti’s proof, and therefore
Gentzen’s proof, conforms to.
1 Introduction
The project of developing constructive foundations for mathematics at the beginning
of the 20th century was largely a reaction to the set-theoretic antinomies that looked
to threaten both classical mathematics and the alternative foundational programs of
Russell and Whitehead, and Frege, though the movement can be traced back at least
to Kroenecker and Poincare´. At that time the contenders for constructive foundations
were the intuitionism of Brouwer and Heyting, and Hilbert’s finitism, though Weyl
and Poincare´’s predicativism should be mentioned as well.1
Pentultimate version. Forthcoming in M. Zack (Ed.), Research in History and Philosophy of Math-
ematics: Proceedings of the CSHPM Annual Meeting in Toronto, Ontario. Toronto: Springer
1 The papers in part I of Benacerraf & Putnam (1983) provide a nice overview of foundational
programs in the early 20th century. See also (Feferman & Hellman, 1995; Feferman, 2005) for
discussions of predicativism.
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The focus of this paper will be on Hilbert’s program, the goal of which, roughly
speaking, was to ground classical mathematics by giving constructive, finitistic con-
sistency proofs for as much of mathematics as possible.2 An obvious goal of the
project would thus have been to prove the consistency of first-order arithmetic with
full induction (or pure number theory, it was often called). A plausible candidate
for such a consistency proof is Gentzen’s (second) proof of the consistency of pure
number theory. The goal of this paper then, is to investigate whether Gentzen’s and
Bernays’s suggestions that said proof is finitisically acceptable can be upheld.
We will take a historically informed approach, beginning in §2 with a discus-
sion of what ‘finitisically acceptable’ should be taken to mean. On the one hand,
we might follow W. W. Tait and conclude that PRA exhausts finitism entirely, on
the other we might take some remarks from Hilbert, Bernays and others seriously,
and conclude that perhaps induction up to certain transfinite ordinals is finitisically
acceptable.
In §3 we will look at the controversial move in Gentzen’s proof—induction on
ordinal notations less than ε0—starting with a brief discussion of Cantor normal
form notions leading to an outline of Gentzen’s proof. The upshot of this will be
that, unless induction up to ε0 is already considered finitistically acceptable, a more
robust, finitistically acceptable proof of the well ordering of ordinal notions less
than ε0 will be needed.
In §4 we introduce a proof due to Gaisi Takeuti (1987, ch. 2, §11) which is a good
candidate for a finitistically acceptable proof of the relevant well-ordering. Once we
have introduced that proof, we discuss (§5) whether it is finitistically acceptable, ar-
guing that, once a small repair is made to Takeuti’s proof, the question comes down
to the status of nested inductions and recursion. We argue that such operations are
acceptable according to what Takeuti (1987, p. 101) calls the “Hilbert-Gentzen fini-
tist standpoint”, though the situation varies depending on how ‘finitism’ is defined.
We conclude by taking a brief look at how the notions employed by Gentzen and
Takeuti could lead to further progress in what we might call the extended Hilbert’s
program.
Finally, note that although we raise various issues related to the possible finitistic
acceptability of Takeuti’s proof and point to solutions, we don’t intend to provide
definitive answers in most cases. Many of these issues would benefit from further
investigation, some of which we plan to do ourselves, but all of which we encourage
others to explore.
2 Finitism
The question of what exactly finitism, in the sense of Hilbert and Bernays, amounts
to has not been given a definitive answer in the literature, and we will not attempt
to give one here. Rather, we will survey some of the evidence, and argue that the
2 See (Zach, 2006) for a thorough introduction to Hilbert’s program.
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lower bound is primitive recursive arithmetic (PRA),3 but that the relevant notion of
finitism allows more than PRA and less than transfinite induction, at least beyond
certain constructible ordinals, the upper bounds of which should be determined by
finitistic considerations. That at least PRA is finistically acceptable is relatively un-
controversial. This is so in part because one of the primary finitist worries has to
do with quantification over completed infinities; PRA is quantifier free, so the issue
simply does not arise. Furthermore, primitive recursion is easily seen to be finitistic
in that, by definition, the values of primitive recursive functions can be found in a
finite number of steps.
Tait (1981, 2002) argues that finitism is completely exhausted by PRA, though
he explicitly notes that he is more concerned with the technical meaning of the term,
separated as much as possible from the historical and philosophical aspects of the
concept. Stenlund (2009) argues that the technical and epistemological aspects of
Hilbert’s finitism cannot be so easily separated, as he takes Hilbert’s epistemolog-
ical aims to be primary. This is because the finite can be the object of intuition in
a strongly Kantian sense,4and thus can be taken as a firm philosophical basis for
mathematics. Given Tait’s (2002) reservations about Kantian intuition, the reason
for this tension should be relatively clear. But, question’s about Hilbert’s philosoph-
ical motivations aside, there are good reasons to think that he and Bernays were
open to the possibility that the relevant notion of ‘finitist’ might go beyond PRA.
The most obvious evidence of this comes from the second volume of Grundlagen
der Mathematik (1939, pp. 347–8), where they state:
[W]e have introduced the expression ‘finitistic’ not as a sharply delineated term, but only
as the name of [a] methodological guideline, which enables us to recognize certain kinds of
concept-formations and ways of reasoning as definitely finitistic and others as definitely not
finitistic. This guideline, however, does not provide us with a precise demarcation between
those which accord with the requirements of the finitistic method and those that do not.5
This passage at least confirms our conjecture that PRA should not be taken as
exhaustive of finitism, as there are no sharp edges to the concept. This may then
allow us to place Takeuti’s well-ordering proof that will be the main focus of this
paper in the grey area above PRA. Further evidence that the finite standpoint might
easily extend beyond PRA is the use of induction upωωω by Wilhelm Ackermann in
his doctoral dissertation, with which Bernays was familiar.6 Despite the deficiency
of Ackermann’s work made obvious by Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems (Go¨del,
1931), neither Hilbert nor Bernays had pointed out anything in Ackermann’s work
that was not finitistically acceptable, so far as we are aware.
Another telling passage from the same book is discussed in detail by both Zach
(1998) and Tait (2002), and gives the impression that Bernays and Hilbert’s concep-
tion of finitism had changed, likely in response to the results of Gentzen and Go¨del
(Go¨del, 1931; Gentzen, 1936):
3 Primitive recursive arithmetic contains the usual recursive definitions of 0, +, ×, and successor,
as well as all other primitive recursive functions, and the quantifier free induction schema.
4 See (Sieg, 2009) for an interesting look Kant’s (and other preceding figures’) influence on Hilbert.
5 (quoted in Zach, 1998, Fn. 16)
6 The proof-theoretic ordinal of PRA is ωω , so Ackermann certainly went beyond PRA.
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Certain methods of finitist mathematics which go beyond recursive number theory (in the
original sense) have been discussed already in §7 [of vol. I of the Grundlagen], namely
the introduction of functions by nested recursion and the more general induction schema.
(Hilbert & Bernays, 1939, p. 340)
What we should take away from this passage, especially in conjunction with
Bernays’s (1935, see below) acceptance that Gentzen’s first consistency proof was
finitisically acceptable, is first that Hilbert and Bernays were willing to recon-
sider what exactly they meant by ‘finitistic’ in light of developments in meta-
mathematics. This should not be seen as their giving up on the original conception
of finitism, but rather as refinement based on new information. In discussing this
passage, Tait (2002, p. 415) points to Hilbert’s discussion of ‘sharpening’ the origi-
nal conception, and Bernay’s discussion of an extension of the finite standpoint. He
takes the first as evidence of the point just made, but wonders whether the second
might mean that certain methods go beyond finitism. It seems to us that it does not,
but we don’t deny that the question is open to interpretation.
The second take away from the last quotation is the more obvious point that
general induction and nested recursion are finitistically acceptable. In addition to
this suggesting that finitism might not be exhausted by PRA, the inclusion of general
induction and nested recursion will be important in the discussion of Takeuti’s proof
of the well-ordering of the ordinal notations less than ε0 below.
The final piece of evidence we will consider here is the mention by Bernays of
Gentzen’s first consistency proof for arithmetic (Gentzen, 1936) which also used
transfinite induction up to ε0, though using a completely different notational system
than the ordinal notations to be introduced in the next section. The last paragraph
of Bernays’s (1935) “Hilberts Investigations into the Foundations of Arithmetic”
reads, in its entirety:
During the printing of this report the proof for the consistency of the full number theoretic
formalism has been presented by G. Gentzen, using a method that conforms to the funda-
mental demands of the finite standpoint. Thereby the mentioned conjecture about the range
of the finite methods (p. 17) is disproved.
The conjecture referred to is the following:
. . . that it was in general impossible to provide a proof for the consistency of the number
theoretic formalism within the framework of the elementary intuitive considerations that
conformed to the “finite standpoint” upon which Hilbert had based proof theory.
As Gentzen is explicit about his use of transfinite induction, and even includes
a discussion of the finitistic acceptability of the same, in which he tentatively con-
cludes that transfinite induction on ordinal notations up to ε0 as employed in his
proof is finitistically acceptable (see especially Gentzen, 1943), it seems unlikely
that Bernays would not have been aware of the potential issue with the proof unless
he had not studied the paper before adding that last paragraph to his article.
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What may be problematic here is that there does not seem to be a principled rea-
son to stop at ε0. Why not induction up to Γ0, or at least to all accessible ordinals?7
One reason might be that ε0 is a seemingly natural stopping point, but what this
naturalness might consist in from a finitist perspective is unclear. Another might be
that to reach ε0, only ω-many iterations of any given (constructive) operation are
needed, whereas this is not the case for the next limit ordinal.
Given this evidence, the likelihood that Hilbert and Bernays’s conception of
finitism went beyond PRA, and may have even included limited forms of transfinite
induction, should be clear. Based on this hypothesis, most of the remainder of this
paper will be devoted to the question of whether Takeuti’s proof of the well-ordering
of ordinal notations for ordinals less than ε0 shows that the transfinite induction used
in Gentzen’s second proof might be considered finitistically acceptable.8
3 Gentzen’s Proof
In this section we will give a brief overview of Gentzen’s second consistency proof
for arithmetic (Gentzen, 1938), beginning with a brief description of ordinal no-
tations in Cantor normal form. The purpose of this is to facilitate discussion of
Gentzen’s use of induction, so will not include details about the reduction steps
themselves. For detailed discussions of this proof we point the reader to Gentzen’s
original paper, or §12 of (Takeuti, 1987).
3.1 Ordinal Notations
A theorem due to Cantor (1897) says that every ordinal can be written as a sum of 0
and exponents of ω , i.e.
α = ωβ1 +ωβ2 +ωβ3 +ωβ4 + . . .
α, β ordinals, the β s either in this form, or 0s, and
β1 ≥ β2 ≥ β3 ≥ . . .
Since we need only consider ordinals less the ε0, and ε0 is the first ordinal such that
ωα = α (i.e. ωε0 = ε0), it is guaranteed that α >ωβi for all i > 1, and α =ωβ1 only
in the case where the ωβi>1 are empty.
7 An ordinal is accessible, roughly, if it can be reached from below. See §6. Compare to the concept
of an inaccessible cardinal for which there is a strong sense in which such cardinals cannot be
reached from below.
8 It is likely much of what follows will apply equally well to the 1936 proof given a finitistically
acceptable translation between the ordinal notation systems.
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An ordinal written in this notation is said to be in Cantor normal form. For ease
of notation we can write ω0 as 1, ω0 +ω0 = 2, and so on for the natural numbers.9
One further condition, that any ‘+0’ terms are deleted, guarantees that each notation
is unique.
We can then write the natural sum of two ordinals, α and µ , α#µ , as a (possibly)
new ordinal in Cantor normal form by interleaving the monomials (terms of the
form ωβi ) so that the β ’s are decreasing.10 It is the well-ordering of these notations,
that Gentzen used for the transfinite induction steps in his proof.11
3.2 Gentzen’s Second Proof
The general strategy of Gentzen’s proof is to take an arbitrary proof in the sequent
calculus with arithmetical initial sequents and the inference rule for (full) arithmeti-
cal induction (i.e. first-order Peano Arithmetic formulated in the sequent calculus)
of the empty sequent and show that such a proof cannot exist.
To do this the ‘end-part’ of a proof is defined as the largest segment of the proof,
looking up from the end-sequent, that contains only structural rules, including in-
ductions. The end-part is then pushed to the top of the proof, which can be done
because the end-sequent contains no connectives, so any complex formulae will
have to have been removed by a cut at some point.
All inductions in the end part of the proof are replaced with sequences of cuts,
and all inessential cuts (cuts on complex formulae) are reduced to essential cuts
(cuts on atomic formulae). Obviously all of this is done in a principled way to a
‘regular’ proof,12 but the details need not concern us here, as what is important is
the use of ordinal notations, and induction thereon.
The key to the proof, and the part that we are here interested in, is showing that
the procedure terminates. Gentzen does this by assigning ordinal notations as de-
fined in §3.1, to the each sequent and inference, and showing that each reduction step
decreases the ordinal notation assigned to the end-sequent of the proof. Although
the procedures for assigning ordinal notations to inductions and cuts are necessar-
ily quite complex, the operations involved are just the stacking of finitely many ω
exponents, the taking of natural sums, and ordinary, arithmetical subtractions, all of
which can easily be seen to be finitistically acceptable.13 The only problem for the
9 Gentzen includes only ‘1’, but Takeuti makes use of this obvious notational extension so we have
included it here for completeness.
10 Note that it may be that βi = βi+1 = . . .= βi+n for some i,n > 0.
11 From outside the finite standpoint it can easily be seen that these notations are well-ordered,
because they are unique, and ε0 is well-ordered by definition. Whether this can be determined
from within the finite standpoint will be discussed in §4 & §5.
12 A regular proof in one in which all of the non-eigen variables have been replaced with 0s and
the eigenvariables have been replaced with appropriate arithmetic terms.
13 Likewise for other inferences, though those cases are more simple.
Takeuti’s Well-Ordering Proof: Finitistically Fine? 7
finitist then, is being able to see that the ordinal notations are well-ordered, which is
to say that the reduction procedure will terminate in finitely many steps.
Of course, a non-finitist will see immediately that the ordinal notations are well
ordered, because each notation denotes a unique ordinal less than ε0, ε0 is an ordinal,
so it is well-ordered by ∈ (i.e. <=∈), thus the ordinal notations are of order type
ε0, so they’re well-ordered. But such reasoning requires that one accepts transfinite
ordinals (albeit relatively small ones) to be completed infinite sets, which is exactly
what the finitist is trying to avoid.
4 Takeuti’s Proof
Takeuti proposes a concrete method for demonstrating that the ordinals <ε0 are
well-ordered. His demonstration consists in applications of a series of (concrete)
methods, which he calls “eliminators”. Eliminators are methods for taking any (con-
cretely) given strictly decreasing sequence of ordinals and (concretely) constructing
a new strictly decreasing sequence of ordinals such that if the latter contains no in-
finitely descending chains neither does the former. Using eliminators, Takeuti gives
a demonstration that the ordinals <ε0 are well-ordered. Takeuti’s original proof is
both brief (about five pages) and quite dense, and so can be difficult to follow. In
this section, therefore, we offer a relatively detailed reconstruction of only a small,
initial part Takeuti’s proof.14 This should be sufficient to grasp the general proof
strategy, and so understand the issues raised thereafter.
4.1 Introducing “Eliminators”
Takeuti begins his proof by supposing that the natural numbers are well-ordered.
That is, for any (strictly) decreasing sequence of ordinals S which begins with some
natural number n, the length of S is, at most, n + 1 (1987 pp. 92–93).15 Hence,
no strictly decreasing sequence of ordinals which begins with a natural number is
infinite. Takeuti’s eliminators capitalize on the well-ordering of N and enable him
to demonstrate that (strictly) decreasing sequences of ordinals beginning with any
ordinal, α <ε0 must be finite.
14 We plan to publish a full reconstruction of Takeuti’s well-ordering proof in the near future.
15 Takeuti takes this assumption to be uncontroversial because he sees it as an obvious consequence
of his definitions of ordinals and the relations: ‘=’ , ‘+’ and ‘<’ on the ordinals (1987 pp. 90–91).
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Terms and the 1-eliminator 16
The first eliminator Takeuti introduces is the 1-eliminator.17 The 1-eliminator is
a (concrete) method for constructing a 1-sequence, S′0 from a (concretely) given
decreasing sequence of ordinals, S0. Such that the first ordinal in S′0 is the 1-major
part of the first ordinal in S0 and if S′0 is finite, then (it can be concretely shown that)
S0 is finite. Takeuti explains these terms (and concepts) by way of an illustration:
Consider a (strictly) decreasing sequence of ordinals,
(S0) a0 > a1 > ...
where a0 is not a natural number. Each ordinal, ai in S0 is to be written Cantor
normal form, such that ai has the form:
ωµ i1 +ωµ i2 + ...+ωµ
i
ni + ki
where each µ im > 0, µ im−1 > µ
i
m and ki is a natural number (the i’s are simply meant
to index the given Cantor normal form to ai). Takeuti calls the part of ai which does
not contain ki the 1-major part of ai:
ωµ
i
1 +ωµ
i
2 + ...+ωµ
i
ni︸ ︷︷ ︸
1-major part of ai
+ki
Let the 1-major part of ai be written as: a′i. Takeuti calls a sequence which consists
of just the 1-major parts of each ai in S0 a 1-sequence.
A 1-eliminator is described as a method which takes S0 and (concretely) produces
a decreasing 1-sequence:
(S′0) b0 > b1 > ...
which satisfies the following condition:
(C1) b0 = a′0 (i.e. the 1-major part of a0) and if S
′
0 is finite, then so is S0.
At this stage, it is important to emphasize Takeuti’s use of ‘>’ in S′0. This indi-
cates that applying the 1-eliminator to S0 produces a strictly decreasing 1-sequence.
Hence, S′0 may not be the very same sequence as the sequence which would be pro-
duced simply by removing each ki from every ai in S0. S′0 does not contain multiple
occurrences of identical ordinals, whereas simply removing each ki from every ai
in S0 may result a sequence that contains multiple occurrences of identical ordinals.
This feature of the decreasing sequences constructed from (applying) eliminators is
extremely important for Takeuti’s argument.
The 1-eliminator is shown to satisfy (C1) as follows. By definition, each ordinal
in S0 is identical with its 1-major part plus a given natural number. That is, ai =
a′i + ki for all ai in S0. Hence, S0 can be written as:
a′0 + k0 > a
′
1 + k1 > ...
16 All content in this section is from or adapted from: (Takeuti 1987 p. 93)
17 All subsequent eliminators (and their associated terminology) are analogous to the 1-eliminator.
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applying a 1-eliminator to this sequence still produces the 1-sequence, S′0. Now, take
some finite part of S′0, say the sequence:
b0 > b1 > ... > bm
where, b0 = a′0 and bm = a
′
i (for some i). So, either a
′
i = a
′
i+1 = ...= a
′
i+p (for some
p) and ai+p is the last term in S0,18 or a′i+p > a′i+p+1. If the former is the case, then
stop. If the latter is the case, then make bm+1 = a′i+p+1 and repeat. If one arrives
at a sequence of a′i’s such that bm = a′i and a′i = a′i+1 = ... = a
′
i+p = ..., it follows
that S0 must be finite. Since S0 is a strictly decreasing sequence, a′i = a′i+1 = ... =
a′i+p = ... entails that ki > ki+1 > ... > ki+p > .... Given the well-ordering of the
natural numbers, the latter sequence must be finite. Hence, S0 must be finite. Given
the definition of S′0 (i.e. a strictly decreasing 1-sequence constructed from S0), if S
′
0
is finite, then there is a (last) term, bm in S′0 such that bm = a
′
i and a
′
i = a
′
i+1 = ...=
a′i+p = .... Therefore, if S′0 is finite, so is S0.
Proving a well-order with the 1-eliminator19
Takeuti uses the 1-eliminator to show that all decreasing sequences of ordinals
which begin with an ordinal < ω2 must be finite. Consider the sequence:
(S1) a0 > a1 > ...
where a0 < ω2. Applying a 1-eliminator to S1 enables the construction of the 1-
sequence:
(S′1) b0 > b1 > ...
such that S′1 satisfies condition (C1)
20 and where a0 ≥ b0. Since a0 < ω2, b0 <
ω2. It follows that each ordinal bi in S′1 has the form, ω · ki (where ki is a natural
number). This is clear because ω ·ω = ω2 and any ordinal < ω is a natural number.
Accordingly, since a0 is not a natural number, each bi in S′1 will be of the form, ω ·ki
(where ki is a natural number). Hence, S′1 can be written as:
ω · k0 > ω · k1 > ...
It must then be the case that k0 > k1 > ... (since ω = ω). Given the well-ordering
of the natural numbers, k0 > k1 > ... must be finite. Therefore, b0 > b1 > ... must
be finite. Since S′1 satisfies (C1), S1 must be finite. S1 was arbitrary, so this result
generalizes which means that any decreasing sequence of ordinals which begins
with an ordinal < ω2 must be finite.
The above procedure nicely illustrates Takeuti’s strategy throughout his proof.
He assumes that the sequence of ordinals whose limit is ω (i.e. the natural numbers)
18 That is the last term with a 1-major part.
19 The content in this section is from or adapted from (Takeuti 1987 p. 93).
20 Where (C1) is amended such that S0 is changed to S1 and S′0 is changed to S
′
1.
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is well-ordered. He then defines an eliminator which, when combined with the al-
ready established well-ordering of the natural numbers, enables him to show that the
sequence of ordinals whose limit is ω2 is also well ordered. Takeuti continues with
this strategy such that, with each new eliminator, combined with the well-ordering
of the sequences of ordinals already established, he is able to show that sequences of
ordinals with higher and higher limits must be well-ordered, ending with a demon-
stration of the well-ordering of the ordinals <ε0 .
5 Is this Finitistic?
Having provided a taste of Takeuti’s proof that demonstrates his proof strategy, we
are now in a position to evaluate the finitistic acceptability of that proof, and by
extension the finitistic acceptability of Gentzen’s consistency proof. We will first
correct an omission of Takeuti’s that, while small, is key to the finitistic accept-
ability of an early part of his proof. We will then address the thornier question of
the finitistic acceptability of the multiple nested inductions and recursions needed
nearer the end of the proof.
5.1 An Induction Hypothesis
Takeuti’s reading of a version of Hilbert’s finitist standpoint which he calls ‘the
Hilbert-Gentzen finitist standpoint’ requires concrete method for showing that de-
scending sequences of ordinal notations terminates. Indeed, it is the provision of
such a method that is the main purpose of Takeuti’s proof. However, it does not
appear that such a method has been provided for the case of ωω—in that case we
seem to be no better off than we were with the proof of the accessibility of ε0.
Furthermore, prima facie, (limited) transfinite induction is already assumed.
The core of the problem is that it isn’t obvious from the original presentation
of the proof that the natural number superscripts (ωn) should behave as the natural
numbers qua natural numbers do (without non-finitistic background assumptions).
This is due to the lack of a concrete justification of the induction hypothesis: any
descending sequence do > d1 > ..., with d0 < ωn is finite. This is transfinite induc-
tion. Luckily this problem is easily remedied. To show that any descending sequence
do > d1 > ..., with d0 < ωn where n≥ 3 is finite, proceed as follows:
In a manner analogous to demonstrating that the 1-eliminator satisfies (C1), show
that the 2-eliminator satisfies (C2)21 by appealing to the now established well-
ordering of the ordinals < ω2. Then use the 2-eliminator to prove the well-ordering
of the ordinals up to ω3. Next, show that the 3-eliminator satisfies (C3) by appealing
21 Where, (C2) is an appropriate analogue of (C1).
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to the well-ordering of the ordinals up to ω3. Then use the 3-eliminator to prove the
well-ordering of the ordinals up to ω4.
Continue in this way until reaching the (n− 1)-eliminator. Use the established
well-ordering of the ordinals up to ωn−1 to show that the (n−1)-eliminator satisfies
(Cn−1). Then use the (n− 1)-eliminator to prove the well-ordering of the ordinals
< ωn.
This procedure will establish that the induction hypothesis holds for any value of
n in n−2 steps. n−2 is finite and so there is a concrete procedure for demonstrating
the induction hypothesis for any value of n that will terminate in a finite number of
steps. Once this is made explicit, the need to assume transfinite induction has been
eliminated.
5.2 A Final Finitistic Worry
Once we’ve eliminated this last apparent vestige of transfinite induction, we can
look more closely at whether Takeuti succeeds in showing that the use of ordinal
notations in Cantor normal form in Gentzen’s consistency proof, and hence that
consistency proof as a whole, is finitistically acceptable. The most serious objection
to the finitistic acceptability of Takeuti’s proof is his use of multiple nested induc-
tions and recursions later in the proof. Although the method remains the same as the
ωn case, much more nesting is needed to work down to the case of natural numbers
where finitude can finally be established. In other words, the closer we get to ε0 , the
more ‘simultaneus’ recursion and induction steps are needed to build the relevant
eliminators.
The question of whether these multiple inductions and recursions can be justified
finitistally will be answered differently depending on the conception of finitism you
are working with. We’ll look at three cases, the first two admit of straightforward
solutions, while the third is more difficult.
The easiest case is for those, like Tait, who insist that finitism is exhausted by
PRA. The nested recursion needed for the final steps of Takeuti’s proof are not
primitive, and so the proof as a whole wouldn’t be finitisically fine. On the other
hand, if our motivation is purely historical—if we wished to vindicate Hilbert and
Bernays’s assertions that Gentzen’s proof conforms to the finitist standpoint—then
we have good reason to think that Takeuti’s proof is fine. The two quotations from
the Grundlagen in §2 are good evidence; the second appearing to explicitly allow
just the sorts of constructions that we’re concerned with. Here it is again:
Certain methods of finitist mathematics which go beyond recursive number theory (in the
original sense) have been discussed already in §7 [of vol. I of the Grundlagen], namely
the introduction of functions by nested recursion and the more general induction schema.
(Hilbert & Bernays, 1939, p. 340)
The more difficult case arises when the interest in finitism or constructivism
comes from contemporary philosophical considerations. For example, we might
be concerned about the justification of our arithmetic beliefs. In such cases more
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principled justifications would need to be given for accepting or rejecting Takeuti’s
methods. We won’t attempt to survey the conceptual space here,22 but rather con-
tent ourselves with a few thoughts relating to the Hilbert-Gentzen standpoint that
we believe may be more widely applicable.
Takeuti charactarises his Hilbert-Gentzen standpoint as one which
avoids abstract notions as much as possible, except those which are eventually reduced to
concrete operations or Gedankenexperimente on concretely given sequences. (p. 100-101)
He takes this to be a “natural extension” of Hilbert’s standpoint, and goes on to very
briefly address the question we’re now concerned with, saying:
Of course we also have to deal with operations on operations, etc. However, such operations,
too, can be thought of as Gedankenexperimente on (concrete) operations. (p. 101)
The latter quotation appears to justify nested recursion or induction by appeal-
ing to what we might call ‘meta-recursion’. Concretely given sequences are con-
crete by definition, operations on those are either concrete or Gedankenexperimente,
which are finitisically fine, then operations on operations are just Gedankenexper-
imente on operations and sequences already determined to be finitistically accept-
able. More obviously needs to be said here, but something first needs to be said
about Gedankenexperimente.
Gedankenexperimente include at least those iterated procedures that can be seen
to apply and lead to a stated conclusion, but where all of the steps are not explicitly
performed. Our fix to Takeuti’s proof in the previous subsection is an example. We
can see that the procedure for the cases of ω3 and ω4 can be applied for each suc-
cessive value of n for ωn. The inference from that observation to the existence of a
(n−1)-eliminator is a Gedankenexperiment. More generally, Gedankenexperimente
allow us to employ small amounts of reasoning that isn’t strictly finitistic to make
meta-logical inferences with concrete start- and end-points, with the understanding
that those inferences are in principle finitistically fine.
Returning to the question of “operations on operations” in the Hilbert-Gentzen
standpoint, we need only observe that we are only ever operating on concrete se-
quences and operations. You might say that concreteness is passed upwards through
concrete operations and Gedankenexperimente. As long as the latter are finitisti-
cally fine, then so are Takeuti’s nested inductions and recursions (with respect to the
Hilbert-Gentzen standpoint).
6 Beyond the Proofs
Before moving on the the consistency proof for arithmetic, Takeuti (pp. 97–100)
makes two relevant points. The first is that his method of proof, as discussed in
the previous section, is closely related to the notion of accessibility, discussed by
Gentzen in his (1936). The second is that his method can be extended beyond ε0.
22 But see (Incurvati, 2005)
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The latter should give us pause when wearing our finitist hats, as it suggests that
if Takeuti’s proof is finitistically acceptable, then transfinite induction (on ordinal
notations) extending beyond ε0 should be as well.
Takeuti (1987, p. 98) characterises accessible ordinals by saying that they are
such that every descending sequence of ordinals beginning with that ordinal is fi-
nite, and proceeds to sketch a proof showing that ε0 is accessible. From the defini-
tions it is easy to see that, at the very least all of the notations for the constructible
ordinals below the next limit ordinal greater than ε0 are accessible, which gives us
the accessibility of that limit. Then, if we take accessibility as sufficient for finitistic
acceptability, we will get a great deal of transfinite induction beyond ε0-induction.
Of course, there may be principled reasons for a finitist to stop at ε0, but that would
have to be separate from its accessibility. It is not clear how far you could take the
procedure Takeuti’s proof, but it appears that if the proof he gave shows that in-
duction up to ε0 is acceptable from a philosophically interesting finitist standpoint,
then we may very well be able to find finitistically acceptable consistency proofs for
systems stronger than PA.
Indeed, Takeuti (1987, §26) uses the notion of accessibility in his development of
ordinal diagrams for use in the proof of the consistency of Π 11 -CA (a subsystem of
second-order arithmetic or analysis) motivated by constructive considerations. All
of this could lead us to two very different conclusions. The first is that Hilbert’s
program, suitably modified, has actually achieved a lot of success—the consistency
of Π 11 -CA is a significant result. On the other hand, the fact that this result can be
achieved might worry a finitist, as analysis involves quantification over completed
infinite sets of natural numbers.
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